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Motivated, on the one hand, by the belief that the Fed controls the short-
term rate through open market operations, and on the other, by “the lack of 
convincing proof that this is what happens,” Hamilton (1997) suggested 
that more convincing evidence of the liquidity effect could be obtained 
with the use of high-frequency (daily) data.  Thornton’s (2001a) detailed 
analysis of Hamilton’s results and evidence using both Hamilton’s and an 
alternative methodology indicates a quantitatively unimportant daily 
liquidity effect. Recently, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) report “clear 
evidence” of a daily liquidity effect using a more comprehensive reserve-
supply-shock measure than that used by Hamilton.  This paper investigates 
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Jim Hamilton and Sherry Edwards for useful comments and John McAdams for helpful research assistance.  It is generally conceded that the Fed uses open market operations to control the federal 
funds rate through the “liquidity effect.”  Open market purchases of government 
securities drive the funds rate down; open market sales push the funds rate up.  The 
liquidity effect must exist if the demand for reserves is negatively sloped in the funds rate 
because, in this case, an exogenous change in the supply of reserves will generate a 
change in the federal funds rate in the opposite direction.  Despite the liquidity effect’s 
axiomatic quality, Hamilton (1997) (hereafter, Hamilton) notes that “it is very difficult to 
find convincing proof that this is indeed what happens.”
1  A negatively sloped demand 
curve is sufficient for the liquidity effect’s existence; it does not guarantee that it is large 
and economically meaningful. 
Noting that most attempts at identifying a liquidity effect have used low-
frequency (monthly or quarterly) data, Hamilton suggests that the lack of success in 
isolating the liquidity effect is due to the fact that, of necessity, low-frequency data mixes 
together the effect of policy on economic variables with the effect of economic variables 
on policy.  To avoid this problem, Hamilton sought to develop “a more convincing 
measure of the liquidity effect.”
2  Rather than attempting to identify the effect of 
monetary policy over a month or quarter, Hamilton investigated the effect of an 
exogenous shock to the supply of reserves on the funds rate at the daily frequency.  
Reasoning that a reserve supply shock is analogous to an exogenous open market 
operation, a significant response of the funds rate to a reserve supply shock is prima facie 
evidence that the Fed can generate changes in the funds rate through open market 
operations.  The existence of a statistically significant and qualitatively important daily 
                                                 
1 Hamilton (1997), p. 80. 
2 Hamilton (1997), p. 80. 
  1liquidity effect would suggest the relevance of the liquidity effect at lower frequencies 
where it is much more difficult to isolate.  Of course, the converse is true.  Finding a 
weak and qualitatively unimportant daily liquidity effect casts doubt on its importance at 
frequencies more relevant for monetary policy.  Hence, the existence and magnitude of 
the daily liquidity effect has important implications for monetary policy. 
Noting several shortcomings in Hamilton’s methodology, Thornton (2001a) found 
that Hamilton’s result was the consequence of a few days when there were 
uncharacteristically large changes in the federal funds rate.  Using Hamilton’s procedure, 
he also found no evidence of a liquidity effect for sample periods before and after 
Hamilton’s.  Furthermore, reasoning that if the Fed changed the funds rate through open 
market operation then the supply of nonborrowed reserves should change significantly 
when the Fed changes the target for the federal funds rate, Thornton (2001a) found “little 
support for the conventional view that the Fed controls the funds rate using open market 
operations.”
3  This finding has been confirmed recently by a detailed analysis of open 
market operations conducted by the Fed over the period 1984 – 1996 (see Thornton 
2006a). 
Recently, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) (hereafter, C&D) find “clear evidence 
of a liquidity effect at the daily frequency.”
4  Moreover, they find that the estimated size 
of the liquidity effect is economically meaningful.  Unlike Hamilton, who used one 
component of autonomous factors that affect supply and estimated the supply shock, 
C&D have all of the autonomous factors that affect reserve supply and have the actual 
error made by the staff of the Board of Governors in forecasting these factors.  They 
                                                 
3 Thornton (2001a), p. 76. 
4 C&D, p. 16. 
  2argue that their reserve-supply-shock measure is both more comprehensive than 
Hamilton’s and represents the actual shocks to reserves that occurred in carrying out open 
market operations. 
Given the importance of the liquidity effect and the uncertainty about its 
importance empirically, I investigate the daily liquidity effect using C&D’s measure.  In 
so doing, I point out that (a) this measure does not necessarily reflect the reserve supply 
shocks made by the Fed in the conduct of open market operations, and (b) this measure 
does not mitigate the other criticisms of Hamilton’s methodology and, hence, of C&D’s. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews the 
evidence on the daily liquidity effect prior to C&D.  Section 3 presents C&D’s analysis 
and shows why it does not overcome the concerns raised by Thornton (2001a).  A 
detailed analysis of the daily liquidity effect using C&D’s reserve-supply-shock measure 
is presented in Section 4.  The conclusions and implications are presented in Section 5. 
2.0  The Daily Liquidity Effect 
Each day the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, 
the Desk) estimates the quantity of reserves that banks will demand over a two-week 
maintenance period, conditional on the target for the federal funds rate and the quantity 
of reserves that will be supplied if the Desk conducts no open market operations that 
day.
5  If the former exceeds the latter, the operation procedure suggests that the Desk add 
reserves through an open market purchase.  If the former is smaller than the latter, the 
procedure suggests that reserves be drained through an open market sale. 
                                                 
5 A more detailed analysis of the Desk’s operating procedure can be found in Feinman (1993) and Thornton 
(2001b, 2006a). 
  3An important ingredient to the operating procedure is the estimate of the supply of 
reserves due to autonomous factors that affect supply—the float, currency in circulation, 
the Treasury’s balance at the Fed, etc.  If autonomous factors on the day turn out to be 
larger than estimated, there is a positive reserve supply shock.  If they are smaller than 
expected, the shock is negative.  As Hamilton noted, a supply shock is analogous to an 
exogenous open market purchase of an equal magnitude.  Hence, evidence of a 
statistically significant and economically important response of the funds rate to a reserve 
supply shocks is evidence that the Desk can move the funds rate through open market 
operations. 
Because errors in forecasting the Treasury’s balance are an important source of 
the error in forecasting autonomous factors affecting the supply of reserves, Hamilton 
approximated the errors made in forecasting the Treasury’s balance.  Specifically, using 
daily data on the Treasury’s balance with the Fed over the period April 6, 1989 – 
November 27, 1991, he estimated an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model of the 
Treasury’s balance.  Hamilton then found a negative (i.e., an unexpected increase in the 
Treasury balance reduces reserves) and statistically significant coefficient on his reserve 
shock measure in an EGARCH model of nonborrowed reserves, suggesting that he had 
correctly identified a reserve supply shock analogous to the shock made by the Fed in 
conducting open market operations.  Finally, he found a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on his supply shock measure in an EGARCH model of the daily 
change in the federal funds rate—i.e., a daily liquidity effect.  However, the daily 
liquidity effect was statistically significant only on the last day of the two-week 
maintenance period, known as settlement Wednesday. 
  4Thornton (2001a) noted three shortcomings of Hamilton’s analysis.  First, he 
observed that the estimated coefficient on Hamilton’s reserve-supply-shock variable in 
his nonborrowed reserves equation was -0.42, significantly different from its theoretical 
value of -1.0.
6  Hence, Hamilton’s estimates differed significantly from the true forecast 
errors the Desk makes each day in conducting open market operations.
7 
Second, Thornton (2001a) noted that there is a two-day lag in the 
“contemporaneous” accounting system that the Fed introduced in March 1984.  
Specifically, banks satisfy their reserve requirements by holding reserves over a two-
week maintenance period ending Wednesday, while banks’ reserve requirements are 
based on deposit balances that banks hold over a two-week period ending two days 
earlier—the second Monday of the maintenance period.  Thornton (2001a) argued that 
because of this two-day lag, the demand for reserves is perfectly interest inelastic on the 
last two days of the maintenance period.  Consequently, he suggested it is impossible to 
estimate the slope of the demand curve (the essence of the liquidity effect) on settlement 
Tuesday or settlement Wednesday. 
Analyses by Clouse and Dow (2002) and Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002) 
show that Thornton’s implication need not hold if individual banks behave optimally with 
respect to the reserve carryover provision.  If banks follow such procedures, it would be 
possible to estimate the slope of the demand curve on the last two days of the 
maintenance period.  These models ignore the costs of operating such a procedure which 
are likely to be large relative to the cost satisfying a reserve shortfall at the end of the 
                                                 
6 See Thornton (2001b) for an explanation of why -1.0 is the correct theoretical value of the coefficient. 
7 This implication is confirmed by Thornton (2004). 
  5maintenance period.
8  Consequently, it is not clear that such intense reserve 
management—though technically feasible—is economically viable.  It seems safe to 
conclude only that the nature of reserve demand on the last two days of the maintenance 
period is uncertain.  How the funds rate responds to reserve supply shocks on these days 
is an empirical issue that will be addressed. 
Third, Thornton (2001a) noted that reserve requirements are based on the 
averaged holdings reserves over the fourteen days of the two-week maintenance period.  
The large changes in the funds rate that tend to occur on settlement Wednesdays are due 
to an imbalance between the aggregate reserves demanded by all banks, on average over 
the maintenance period, and the aggregate amount of reserves supplied by the Fed over 
the period.  Consequently, shocks to reserves will cause large changes in the funds rate 
only if they are large enough to create an imbalance between the aggregate reserve supply 
and aggregate reserve demand.  Since a one-day shock to the Treasury’s balance 
contributes only one-fourteenth to the weekly-average imbalance, Thornton (2001a) 
suggested that it would take a very large shock to the Treasury’s balance on the last day 
of the maintenance period to generate a large maintenance-period-average reserve 
imbalance.  The implication is that the statistically significant response of the funds rate 
that Hamilton finds on settlement-Wednesday is due either to relatively large shocks to 
the Treasury’s balance on settlement Wednesdays or it is spurious—the consequence of a 
few relatively large settlement-Wednesday changes in the funds rate. 
Thornton (2001a) finds that Hamilton’s settlement-Wednesday effect is due to 
just six of the sixty-nine settlement Wednesdays in his sample period.  When these 
                                                 
8 The one-day cost of paying a one-percentage-point premium on a $100 million dollar reserve shortfall is 
$2,739.73.   
  6observations are accounted for, there is no statistically significant liquidity effect on 
settlement Wednesday or any other day of the maintenance period.  Moreover, using 
Hamilton’s methodology, he found no statistically significant negative response of the 
funds rate to reserve supply shocks for sample periods before and after Hamilton’s. 
Thornton (2001a) then attempted to estimate the liquidity effect using an 
alternative methodology.  Specifically, he estimated the reduced-from equation of 
nonborrowed reserves obtained from a structural model of the reserve market (Thornton, 
2001b).  If open market operations were responsible for changes in the funds rate, there 
should be a statistically significant change in nonborrowed reserves on days when it 
would have implemented changes in Fed’s target for the funds rate.  Thornton (2001a) 
found a statistically significant but quantitatively very small response before 1994 but not 
after.  He concluded that there was “little support” for the daily liquidity effect. 
3.0  The Daily Liquidity Effect à la Carpenter and Demiralp 
C&D attempt to overcome some of the issues raised by Thornton (2001a) by 
using a more comprehensive measure of reserve supply shocks.  Specifically, they use the 
actual forecast error for all of the autonomous factors made by the staff of the Board of 
Governors ( ).  Using   mitigates, but does not eliminate, Thornton’s 
(2001a) criticism.  The reason is each day two estimates of autonomous factors are 
made—one by the Board’s staff and another by the staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York.  Indeed, for the most important component of autonomous factors—the 
Treasury’s balance at the Fed—three estimates are made.  The staff of the U.S. Treasury 
also makes an estimate.  Thornton (2004) shows that the Desk uses a weighted average of 






9  How the Desk weights the remaining components is unclear.  Nevertheless, 
Thornton’s (2004) finding makes it clear that   is not the forecast error the Desk 
makes in the conducting open market operations. 
BOG
t miss
Moreover, using   does nothing to alleviate Thornton’s (2001a) other 
criticisms.  Specifically, given the uncertainty about reserve demand on the last two days 
of the maintenance period, the extent to which the liquidity effect can be estimated on 
settlement Tuesdays or Wednesdays is in doubt.  More specifically, the statistically 
significant coefficients that C&D obtain on settlement Tuesday and Wednesday are not 
necessarily evidence of “a daily frequency liquidity effect…the reciprocal of the partial 
derivative of the demand for balances with respect to the funds rate,”—i.e., 1/
BOG
t miss
β , where 
β  is the slope of the demand curve for reserves—as C&D contend.
10 
Furthermore, it remains true that it takes a large settlement Wednesday shock to 
the Treasury’s balance to generate an aggregate imbalance on settlement Wednesday.  
Because   is more comprehensive than the measure Hamilton used, it is 
reasonable to assume that large shocks will occur more frequently.  The shocks range 
from - $ 6.78 billion to $ 9.34 billion, and the average absolute value of  , $ 0.79 
billion, is fifty percent larger than the average absolute error in forecasting the Treasury’s 
balance.  However, one-day shock contributes only one-fourteenth to the aggregate 
maintenance period shock.  Other things the same, the largest one-day shock is equivalent 





                                                 
9 Thornton (2004) has also shown that these three estimates of the Treasury’s balance are independent and 
weighted nearly equally in the optimal forecast. 
10 C&D, p. 13. 
  8this magnitude could account for the large spikes in the funds rate that are associated with 
the close of the maintenance period. 
Finally, unlike Hamilton (1997) and Thornton (2001a), who use the change in the 
effective federal funds rate ( t ff ∆ ), C&D use the spread between the effective federal 
funds rate and federal funds rate target 
* ( tt ) fff f − .  A priori,  t ff ∆  seems like the natural 
variable for measuring the impact of reserve supply shocks on the federal funds rate.  
Using 
*
tt fff f −  rather than t ff ∆  could distort the relationship between the funds rate and 
reserve supply shocks if, for example, negative misses tend to occur more often when the 
funds rate is above than below the target. 
4.0  The Daily Liquidity Effect 
This section analyzes the relationship between   and 
BOG
t miss t ff ∆  using daily data 
over the period January 2, 1986 – January 30, 2004.  The data were supplied by the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve.  The sample period is longer than C&D’s period, 
May 19, 1989, through January 30, 2004.  The federal funds rate is the effective federal 
funds rate, which is a weighted average of federal funds transactions of a group of federal 
funds brokers who report daily to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  Holidays are 
omitted, as are days when   is unavailable.  With these days omitted, there are a 




                                                 
11 There was also an enormous reserve supply shock of more than $30 billion on September 13, 2001.  
Hence, this observation was also deleted.  The last two days of 1986, when there were extremely large 
“window dressing” increases in the funds rate, were also deleted. 
  9Figure 1 presents a simple scatter plot of  t ff ∆  and  .  While it is not 




t ff ∆  and  .  The correlation is -0.092.
12   
BOG
t miss
4.1  EGARCH Estimates of the Liquidity Effect 
The analysis employs an EGARCH (1, 1) model similar to that estimated by 
C&D.  The EGARCH model, which is in the class of autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic (ARCH) models developed by Engle (1982), was introduced by Nelson 
(1991).  C&D’s specification takes the general form 
(1)  tt ff X t β ε ∆= +,        1,2,..., tT =
where  t X  denotes a 1-by-  vector of   regressors and  k k β  denotes the corresponding  -
by-1 vector of coefficients.  The variance of 
k
t ε , 
2
t σ , is assumed to be conditionally 
















=+ + + + + , 
where  t Z  is a 1-by-  vector of observable variables that determine the evolution of the 
variance and 
m
δ  is a corresponding m -by-1 vector of coefficients.  The coefficient ψ  
allows for the possibility of asymmetry in the response shocks to the funds rate. 
Because ARCH models account for heteroskedasticity, they produce estimates of 
β  that are generally more efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS).  The ARCH model 
is designed to capture changes in the variance of the stochastic process that decay over 
time.  Hence, ARCH models are useful when there are clusters of volatility, and 
                                                 
12 This is only slightly weaker than the correlation between
BOG
t miss  and  , which is -0.108.  
Analysis, not presented here, indicates that the results are qualitatively the same when   is used. 
* (
tt ff ff − )
)
* (
tt ff ff −
  10particularly if one is interested in estimating and forecasting the variance of the 
dependent variable. 
Figure 2 presents  t ff ∆  in basis points over the sample period.  While there are 
some volatility clusters, typical of ARCH, there is also a marked decline in volatility 
beginning in late 1999 and a further decline beginning in late 2001.  Moreover, there is a 
relatively large number of volatility spikes, where the funds rate changed by a relatively 
large amount on one day and by a nearly equal but opposite amount the next.  Some of 
these spikes are associated with well-known events, e.g., settlement Wednesday, the first 
and last days of the year, days before a holiday.  Whatever their cause such shocks are 
difficult to predict. 
To account for spikes in the funds rate associated with such events, dummy 
variables are used for each of the 10 maintenance period days ( ,  Di 1,2,...,10 i = ); for the 
first and last days of the month, quarter, and year ( ); for the 
15
th day of the month ( ); for the day before and after holidays; for the day before 
and after changes in the funds rate target ( ); for the month of December 
( ); and for the first and second week of the maintenance period ( ).
13  The 
period of increased volatility of 
, , , , , bom eom boq eoq boy eoy
mom
, , , bh ah btar atar
dec 1, 2 ww
t ff ∆  in late December 1990 through the early part of 
1991 is associated with the Fed’s very large and surprise reduction in reserve 
requirements.
14  Consequently, a dummy variable for the period of the reduction in 
                                                 
13 If the 15
th falls on a weekend or a holiday,   takes on the value of 1 on the business day closest to the 
middle of the month. 
mom
14 Effective December 13, 1990, the 3 percent reserve requirement on nontransaction liabilities was reduced 
to 1.5 percent for weekly reporters, and effective December 27, 1990, the 1.5 percent reserve requirement 
on nontransaction liabilities was reduced to zero for weekly reporters.  The combined effect of these actions 
reduced required reserves by an estimated $13.2 billion. 
  11reserve requirements in 1990 ( ) is also included.
15  As noted above, the variability of  rr ∆
t ff ∆  declines in late 1999 and declines further in late 2001, hence, two dummy variables 
are used, one for the period November 1, 1999, through August 31, 2001 ( ), and 
the other for the period after September 1, 2001 ( ). 
1999 d
2001 d
C&D include a variable for the expected change in the funds rate target on the day 
before a target change and the unexpected target change on the day of a target change.  
The expectations are implied from the federal funds futures market using the procedure 
suggested by Kuttner (2001).  The federal funds futures contract was introduced in 
October 1988 and, hence, these variables would not be available for the entire sample 
period and are not used in this analysis.  Because the coefficient on 
*
t ff ∆  summarizes the 
effect of an unexpected target change, the change in the funds rate target (
*
t ff ∆ ) is used.
16 
Table 1 reports the estimates of the coefficients of (1) and (2) along with the 
marginal significance level in the adjacent column.  There are three sets of estimates 
corresponding to three different specifications of the model.  The first two sets are for 
EGARCH models that differ solely in that one assumes that the errors are normally 
distributed while the other assumes that the errors are distributed as Student’s t.  The third 
set is OLS, where the standard errors are obtained using White’s (1980) heteroskedastic-
consistent estimates.  The specification of  t Z  is the same as C&D’s, except that  , 
, and   are included. 
rr ∆
1999 d 2001 d
                                                 
15   takes on the value 1 from the first settlement Wednesday affected by the changes, December 26, 
1990, until the settlement period ending March 05, 1991, and zero elsewhere. 
rr ∆
16 These variables were included for a shorter sample period corresponding to C&D’s.  The coefficients on 
the maintenance-period partitions of 
BOG
t miss  were insensitive to whether these variables were included. 
  12The estimates of the parameters of (2) are broadly similar to those reported by 
C&D.  As expected, the coefficient on  rr ∆  is positive and significant for both the normal 
and Student’s t specifications.  Likewise, as expected, the coefficients on   and 
 are negative, with the absolute value of the coefficient of the former being smaller 




t miss  is partitioned by the day of the maintenance period.  For the EGARCH–
normal specification, six of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level and, of these, five are negative.  For the Student’s t specification, six of the ten 
coefficients are statistically significant and all of these are negative.  Moreover, the 
estimate of the degrees of freedom parameter (dof ) is about 3, suggesting a strong 
departure from normality, which is consistent with evidence on financial data more 
generally. 
A comparison of the parameters of interest from the two EGARCH specifications 
reveals that the estimates of the day-of-the-maintenance-period coefficients are sensitive 
to the distributional assumption.  For example, the coefficient on  x  is 
relatively large and statistically significant for the normal specification, but small and 
statistically insignificant for the Student’s t specification.  The reverse is true for the 
coefficient on  x .  Somewhat more troubling is the fact that the coefficient on 
x  is positive and statistically significant for the normal specification and 
negative and statistically significant for the Student’s t specification.  These sharp 
differences stem from the fact that two EGARCH specifications weight the individual 
observations very differently. 
BOG miss 9 D
BOG miss 6 D
BOG miss 5 D
  13The estimated coefficients for the White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent, 
OLS specification are negative for all but one day, but are statistically significant for only 
four of the ten days during the maintenance period.  Also, the estimated coefficients for 
the OLS specification are much larger in absolute value than the corresponding 
EGARCH estimates.  This is due to the fact that OLS is influenced by the extreme 
observations, while EGARCH tends to down-weight these observations. 
All three of the estimates of β  in Table 1 are consistent, and all three procedures 
generate consistent estimates of the variances.  Hence, asymptotic theory provides no 
basis for preferring one set of estimates over another.  While the sample size is very 
large—4499 observations—the number of observations on each day of the maintenance 
period is much smaller.  Moreover, with the exception of the last two days of the 
maintenance period, there is no particular reason to expect the response to be different on 
average for a particular day in the maintenance period.  Given this fact, together with the 
sensitivity of the EGARCH estimates to the distribution assumption and the marked 
difference between the OLS and EGARCH estimates noted in Table 1, it seems 
reasonable to estimate the response for a group of days rather than each day of the 
maintenance period separately.  Consequently, the days of the maintenance period are 
partitioned into the last two days (L2D) and the other eight days (NL2D). 
Also, any effect of a supply shock on the funds rate will be distorted on days 
when the funds rate target is changed.  Consequently, the sample is partitioned by days 
when the funds rate target is changed (
*
t df f ∆ ) and days when it is not ( ). 
*
t dn ff ∆
  14Finally, C&D found that the coefficients on   were statistically significant 
only for large shocks, i.e.,   $1 billion.  Consequently,   is partitioned 











Estimates for the three specifications are reported in Table 2.  A comparison of 
Tables 1 and 2 reveals that most of the other parameters in the model are relatively 
unaffected by the alternative partitioning of  .  Consistent with C&D’s findings, 
small misses do not have a statistically significant impact on the funds rate.  Also, the 





BOG miss r 
The results for   on days when the target was not changed on the last two 
days of the maintenance period are somewhat mixed.  The coefficients are relatively large 
and statistically significant for both the EGARCH–normal and OLS specifications, but 
small and not statistically significant for the EGARCH–Student’s t specification.  There 
is clear evidence of a statistically significant response on the other eight days of the 
maintenance period; however, the size of the response differs greatly between the two 
EGARCH specifications and, of course, between either of the EGARCH specifications 
and OLS.  Indeed, for the EGARCH–normal specification, the estimated response 
appears to be statistically significant, but economically unimportant. 
lg
BOG miss
4.2  The Impact of Outliers 
Thornton (2001a) found Hamilton’s results to be sensitive to six observations 
when there were large changes in the funds rate that happened to occur on days when 
there were unusually large shocks to Hamilton’s reserve-supply-shock measure.  Three of 
  15the six observations occurred during the turbulent period following the surprise 
reductions in reserve requirements in December 1990.  Using Thornton’s (2001a) 
criterion of a change in the funds rate of 80 basis points or larger, there were 33 days 
when   basis points and |  $1 billion, in the direction consistent with 
the liquidity effect.  These observations are presented in Table 3.  A priori, there is no 
reason to single out days when there are unusually large changes in the funds rate.  
However, eight of these (shaded in Table 3) are associated with the December 1990 
surprise reduction in reserve requirements.  Most of the others occurred on the last two 
days of the maintenance period, the first or last day of a month, year, quarter, or the 
middle of the month—days when there tend to be large temporary spikes in the funds 
rate. 
| | 80 t ff ∆≥ |
BOG
t miss ≥
In any event, the sensitivity of the estimated parameters to these “outliers” is 
investigated by partitioning   into these days and all other days.  Sixteen of the 33 
outliers occurred on settlement Tuesday or Wednesday.  Hence,   on the last two 
days of the maintenance period is partitioned into these 16 days and the remaining 280 
days.  Seventeen of the outliers occurred on the other days of the maintenance period.  








The results are summarized in Table 4.  To conserve space, only the estimates for 
the various partitions of   are presented along with the corresponding marginal 
significance levels.  These results indicate that the statistically significant effect of large 
BOG
t miss
  16shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period in the OLS specification, reported 
in Table 2, is due entirely to these outliers.  The coefficient on the outliers is  
-15.892 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The coefficient on the 
remaining days is -0.157 and not statistically significant at even the 20 percent level.  The 
EGARCH-estimated coefficient for large shocks on the last two days of the maintenance 
period was not statistically significant for the Student’s t distribution in Table 2 and 
remains so when the shocks are partitioned.  The estimates for both outliers and non-
outliers are negative and statistically significant for the normal distribution; however, the 
estimate is nearly 23 times larger for the 16 outliers (-32.938 versus -1.457). 
Estimates for other than the last two days of the maintenance period are also 
affected by outliers.  For the OLS estimates both coefficients are statistically significant; 
however, the estimate for the 17 outlier observations is -23.677 compared with -0.754 for 
the remaining observations. 
The estimates for other than the last two days of the maintenance period are 
likewise sensitive for the EGARCH models.  The estimates for the EGARCH–Student’s t 
specification are -32.998 and -0.701 for the outlier and other observations, respectively.  
Both estimates are statistically significant.  The corresponding estimates for the normal 
distribution are -20.232 and -0.143, with the latter coefficient being not statistically 
significant at even the 10 percent level. 
The results for the OLS or EGARCH–Student’s t specification suggest that there 
is no statistically significant response of the funds rate to supply shocks on the last two 
days of the maintenance period when outliers are accounted for.  For the remaining eight 
days of the maintenance period, with the exception of the 17 outliers, large shocks to the 
  17supply of reserves have a relatively small, although statistically significant, effect on the 
funds rate.  Indeed, the estimates from the OLS and EGARCH–Student’s t specifications 
are remarkably similar, -0.754 and -0.701, respectively.  For the EGARCH–normal 
specification, the estimated liquidity effect is much smaller and not statistically 
significant. 
4.3  The Temporal Stability of the Estimated Liquidity Effect 
If the statistically significant reaction of the funds rate to supply shocks is a true 
liquidity effect, it should be stable over time, as there is no particular reason to believe 
that the funds rate should respond to reserve supply shocks during some periods but not 
others.  On the other hand, because the response of the funds rate on the last two days of 
the maintenance period depends on the reserve market conditions at the time of the 
shock, one might expect this response to vary significantly over time.  On settlement days 
when there is a surfeit of reserves, a large negative supply shock will have little or no 
effect on the funds rate.  On days when reserves are particularly scarce, the same shock 
might generate a relatively large response in the funds rate.  Also, recall also that it takes 
a relatively large reserve shock to have much of an affect on the aggregate reserve 
imbalance.  For both of these reasons, one might expect to see considerable temporal 
variation in the response of the funds rate on the last two days of the maintenance period. 
Because of the likely sensitivity of the response to shocks on the last two days of 
the maintenance period and to investigate the temporal robustness of the funds rate to 
supply shocks on other days in the maintenance period, the OLS and EGARCH–
Student’s t model are estimated with rolling regressions of 600 observations.
17  The 
                                                 
17 The EGARCH–normal specification was also estimated, but, to conserve space, not presented here.  The 
results are generally similar to the OLS estimates.  However, coefficient for the last two days of the 
  18nearly 30-month window should be sufficiently long to yield relatively precise estimates 
of the parameters as well as capture any significant time variation in the effect of reserve 
supply on the funds rate. 
Estimates of the response of the funds rate to small shocks on days when the 
target was not changed for the OLS and EGARCH–Student’s t models are presented in 
Figures 3 and 4, respectively.  The estimated coefficients are represented by the solid 
line, and dashed lines represent plus or minus two standard errors.  The estimates are 
plotted on the last day of the sample period.  As before, the standard errors for the OLS 
estimates are obtained using White’s heteroskedastic-consistent procedure.  These figures 
show that the conclusion from Table 2—the response of the funds rate to small supply 
shocks is not statistically significant—is robust to the sample period.  The estimated 
coefficients range from negative to positive values for both specifications and are rarely 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Figures 5 and 6 present the OLS and EGARCH estimates, respectively, for large 
shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period for days when there were no 
outliers.  The effect of these 16 outliers on the OLS estimates is demonstrated by 
presenting the estimates (shown in red) with these observations included.  The 
EGARCH–Student’s t estimates including the outliers is not presented because the 
estimates were relatively insensitive to the presence or absence of these observations. 
Consistent with the findings of the previous section, with the exception of a brief 
period in the late 1990s, the estimated coefficients for the OLS specification are not 
statistically significant.  Moreover, as expected, the effect of the 16 outliers is dramatic.  
                                                                                                                                                 
maintenance period exhibits extreme volatility, at times switching quickly from large positive to large 
negative values. 
  19When these observations are not excluded, the estimated response becomes larger, 
particularly so during the period following the surprise reduction in reserve requirements.  
While the estimated coefficient is most often negative, it is statistically significant only 
for a brief period in the late 1990s. 
Like the OLS estimates, the EGARCH estimates suggest that the effect of supply 
shocks on the last two days of the maintenance period is temporally unstable.  Indeed, 
there is an abrupt change in the estimated coefficient in early 1994.  Unlike the OLS 
estimates, however, there are three periods where the response is statistically significant. 
The estimated coefficients on all but the last two days of the maintenance period 
are presented in Figures 7 and 8.  The OLS estimates are more often than not negative, 
but are statistically significant only for a brief period in the late 1990s.  Again, the OLS 
estimates are very sensitive to the 17 outliers.  The response is much larger when these 
observations are included. 
The parameter estimates for the EGARCH estimates follow a pattern similar to, 
but somewhat more stable than, the OLS estimates.  Moreover, the estimated coefficients 
are generally statistically significant since the late 1990s, but not before. 
The results presented here suggest three conclusions.  First, C&D’s finding that 
the funds rate responds only to large shocks is robust—only large reserve supply shocks 
matter. 
Second, the response of the funds rate to large shocks on settlement Tuesdays and 
Wednesdays appears to be the consequence of unusually large changes in the funds rate 
that sometimes occur on those days.  This conclusion is strongly supported by the OLS 
estimates, but less so by the EGARCH estimates. 
  20Third, once the effect of settlement Tuesdays and Wednesdays and unusually 
large changes in the funds rate are accounted for, the response of the funds rate to large 
reserve supply shocks appears to statistically significant sometime after the mid-1990s 
but not before. 
To further investigate these conclusions, the three models were estimated 
separately for the period January 2, 1986 – August 31, 1995, and the period September 1, 
1995 – January 30, 2004.  The break was chosen by the change from statistical 
insignificance to statistical significance in Figure 8, allowing for the fact that the data are 
plotted on the last day of the sample of 600 observations.  The results are presented in 
Table 5.  Again, to conserve space only the estimates for the various partitions of 
 are presented along with the corresponding marginal significance levels.  Large 
forecast errors on days when there were no changes in the funds rate target are partitioned 





All three conclusions are strongly supported by these estimates.  First, consistent 
with the results presented in Figure 3 and 4, the effect of small shocks to reserves is not 
statistically significant in either period for any of the three specifications. 
Second, with the exception of days identified as outliers, the federal funds rate did 
not respond significantly to large shocks that occurred on the last two days of the 
maintenance period during either sub-period.  Hence, the relatively large settlement 
Tuesday and Wednesday response reported by C&D appears to be due to a few 
observations when there were unusually large changes in the federal funds rate that are 
likely caused by other events. 
                                                 
18 That is,   is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 on the 33 days listed in Table 3 and zero 
otherwise.    is 1 when   is zero and is zero when O  is 1. 
O
NO O
  21Finally, with the exception of the few outliers, there is no statistically significant 
response of the funds rate to large shocks on the other days of the maintenance period 
before September 1995.  This result is robust across specifications.  The response is 
statistically significant after August 1995; however, the estimated magnitude of the 
response on days when there are no outliers is small, ranging from about a third of a basis 
point for the EGARCH–normal specification to just over a basis point for OLS.  There is 
a large, statistically significant response of the funds rate on days identified as outliers; 
however, because these observations occur when there are unusually large changes in the 
funds rate, it is questionable whether these responses should be considered as evidence of 
a liquidity effect.  The liquidity effect should occur on all days and not merely on days 
when there are unusually large changes in the funds rate for other reasons. 
5.0  Summary and Conclusions 
The daily liquidity effect was first investigated by Hamilton (1997) and 
subsequently by Thornton (2001a).  The evidence suggests a weak and economically 
unimportant liquidity effect at the daily frequency.  Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) have 
reopened the issue using a reserve-supply-shock measure that is both more 
comprehensive than that used by Hamilton and Thornton and more closely approximates 
the errors that the Fed actually made in carrying out open market operations.  This paper 
investigates the daily liquidity effect using this measure over an extended sample period. 
The evidence indicates that once the effect of changes in the funds rate target, the last two 
days of the maintenance period, and a few extreme observations are taken into 
consideration, there is a small but statistically significant response of the federal funds 
rate to this reserve-supply-shock measure after August 1995 but not before. 
  22This is encouraging but not convincing evidence of a daily liquidity effect for two 
reasons.  First, because this measure only approximates the true reserve supply shock 
from open market operations, the estimates suffer from the usual stochastic regressor 
problems.  While the effect of this problem on the magnitude of the response cannot be 
determined without additional information, generally speaking, the effect on the standard 
error is to overstate, to some undetermined degree, the precision of the estimate.  
Consequently, we cannot be certain that the estimated response of the funds rate reported 
here is a measure of the true daily liquidity effect. 
Second, even if the estimates are indicative of the true daily liquidity effect, it is 
very small.  Taking the midpoint of the range of estimates of approximately 0.7 basis 
points, it would take a reserve supply shock (or correspondingly an open market 
operation) of nearly $36 billion to generate a 25-basis-point change in the federal funds 
rate.  Hence, it would take a very large open market operation to generate a 25-basis-
point change in the funds rate.  The largest daily open market operation in the period 
January 3, 2000, through January 30, 2004, was $21.5 billion.
19  Hence, while the 
estimates are statistically significant, the practical economic significance is less obvious.  
Indeed, the fact that the response is not statistically significant before mid-1995 and that 
the magnitude of the effect is small thereafter may account for why, in Hamilton’s (1997) 
words, “it is very difficult to find convincing proof that this [the liquidity effect] is indeed 
what happens.”
20 
This lack of a daily liquidity effect may not seem all that remarkable nowadays 
because many analysts (e.g., Friedman, 1999, 2000; Goodhart, 2000; Guthrie and Wright, 
                                                 
19 See Thornton (2006a) for the size of open market operations for the period 1983-1996.   
20 Hamilton (1997), p. 80. 
  232000; Taylor 2001; and Woodford, 2000) suggest that central banks control the overnight 
rate through what Guthrie and Wright (2000) have called open mouth operations, or 
Goodhart (2000) has termed open mouth policy.  As long as market participants believe 
the Fed can control the federal funds rate through open market operations, such 
operations are unnecessary. 
These results are remarkable for the period before the Fed began announcing its 
target for the funds rate, however.  Not only was the funds rate target not announced, but 
Thornton (2006b) shows that the FOMC concealed the fact that it was targeting the funds 
rate.  Consequently, the Fed could not have controlled the funds rate through open mouth 
operations during this period—a liquidity effect was essential.  Consequently, the results 
presented here raise important questions about why the funds rate is so close to the funds 
rate target during this period. 
One possibility for the confluence of relatively modest open market operations 
and large and persistent changes in the funds rate is the possibility that most target 
changes are endogenous—the Fed adjusts its target whenever the equilibrium short-term 
rate changes.  Woodford (2000) and Friedman (2000) consider this explanation 
“implausible”; however, they offer no empirical or documentary evidence to support their 
skepticism. 
Nevertheless, the evidence presented here supports Friedman’s (2000) and 
Woodford’s (2000) suggestion that it would take very large open market operations to 
defend a target rate that differed significantly from the equilibrium rate should market 
participants come to doubt the Fed’s ability to defend its rate objective.  As Friedman 
(2000) suggests, in this event “the market would cease to do the central bank’s work for 
  24it.”
21  Evidence that the Fed has not controlled the funds rate through open market 
operations, and that it would take open market operations much larger than any 
heretofore taken, might cause a breach in the market’s confidence of what the Fed is 
willing or able to do.  Were this to happen, the Fed would have to engage in much larger 
transactions than it has ever done before, give up its overnight interest rate instrument, or 
keep its target for the overnight rate close to the equilibrium level—if, in fact, it has not 
always essentially done so. 
                                                 
21 Friedman (2000), p. 271. 
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Table 1: Estimate of the Response of the Federal Funds Rate to Reserve Supply Shocks: 
January 2, 1986 – January 30, 2004 
Variable Normal    Student’s  t OLS—White   
1 t ff − ∆ x   1 w -0.157 0.000 -0.112 0.000 -0.366 0.000 
1 t ff − ∆ x   2 w -0.062 0.010 -0.020 0.384 -0.168 0.080 
1 D   2.569 0.000 1.908 0.000 -1.346 0.294 
2 D   -6.129 0.000 -5.514 0.000  -14.057  0.000 
3 D   4.998 0.000 5.119 0.000 2.204 0.038 
4 D   -3.800 0.000 -3.242 0.000 -5.095 0.000 
5 D   -1.530 0.000 -1.013 0.000 -5.605 0.000 
6 D   3.221 0.000 2.987 0.000 0.408 0.684 
7 D   -2.808 0.000 -2.675 0.000 -9.981 0.000 
8 D   6.145 0.000 6.299 0.000 7.529 0.000 
9 D   -5.053 0.000 -5.231 0.000 -7.871 0.000 
10 D   7.852 0.000 5.271 0.000  11.155  0.000 
eom   7.418 0.000 6.583 0.000  16.851  0.000 
bom  -2.181 0.000 -1.831 0.003 -0.979 0.628 
eoq  12.479 0.007  4.760  0.253 24.262 0.000 
boq   -1.841 0.498 -4.692 0.058 -4.466 0.564 
eoy   -31.764 0.144 -17.929 0.193 -78.114 0.000 
boy  23.441 0.069 17.241 0.029 32.736 0.044 
mom  7.932 0.000 7.040 0.000  12.516  0.000 
bh   -1.960 0.005 -2.392 0.000 -3.130 0.195 
ah  14.276 0.000 14.172 0.000 19.517 0.000 
rr ∆   -3.903 0.436 -6.348 0.185 -0.163 0.989 
*
t ff ∆   0.426 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.437 0.000 
*
t ff   -0.138 0.003 -0.140 0.000 -0.001 0.991 
dec   -1.239 0.003 -0.928 0.020 0.859 0.562 
BOG miss xat   ar 2.785 0.024 4.000 0.000 4.659 0.203 
BOG miss x   1 D 0.500 0.363 -0.275 0.582 -1.207 0.395 
BOG miss x   2 D -1.041 0.002 -0.911 0.000 -1.609 0.324 
BOG miss x   3 D -0.610 0.021 -0.898 0.000 -2.453 0.003 
BOG miss x   4 D 0.143 0.524 -0.121 0.600 -1.568 0.011 
BOG miss x   5 D 0.310 0.014 -0.434 0.017 -1.489 0.013 
BOG miss x   6 D -0.292 0.315 -0.606 0.025 -1.035 0.163 
BOG miss x   7 D 0.262 0.304 0.155 0.536 -1.170 0.245 
BOG miss x   8 D -1.165 0.012 -1.018 0.013 0.245 0.867 
BOG miss x   9 D -1.439 0.001 -0.293 0.511 -1.150 0.335 
BOG miss x   10 D -3.188 0.000 -2.477 0.000 -6.922 0.003 
Variance Estimates 



















  0.149 0.000 0.216 0.000  --  -- 
2
1 log t σ −   0.672 0.000 0.678 0.000  --  -- 
12 DDD ++ 3   1.160 0.000 1.005 0.000  --  -- 
2 D   -0.528 0.000 -0.641 0.000  --  -- 
7 D   0.058 0.234 -0.080 0.418  --  -- 
btar   0.468 0.000 0.510 0.006  --  -- 
atar   0.781 0.000 0.578 0.001  --  -- 
bh   0.549 0.000 0.410 0.004  --  -- 
ah  1.168 0.000 1.062 0.000  --  -- 
eoq  2.522 0.000 2.221 0.000  --  -- 
dec   0.301 0.000 0.201 0.000  --  -- 
eom   0.881 0.000 0.967 0.000  --  -- 
rr ∆   0.744 0.000 0.896 0.000  --  -- 
1999 d   -0.385 0.000 -0.369 0.000  --  -- 
2001 d   -0.553 0.000 -0.561 0.000     
dof  --  -- 3.208  0.000 --  -- 
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Table 2: Estimate of the Response of the Federal Funds Rate to Large and Small Reserve 
Supply Shocks: January 2, 1986 – January 30, 2004 
Variable  Normal   Student’s t  OLS—White  
1 t ff − ∆ x   1 w -0.158 0.000 -0.113 0.000 -0.365 0.000 
1 t ff − ∆ x   2 w -0.070 0.004 -0.019 0.398 -0.163 0.092 
1 D   2.381 0.000 1.939 0.000 -1.212 0.346 
2 D   -6.059 0.000 -5.363 0.000  -13.823  0.000 
3 D   5.304 0.000 5.186 0.000 2.635 0.017 
4 D   -3.811 0.000 -3.114 0.000 -4.960 0.000 
5 D   -1.692 0.000 -0.955 0.001 -5.364 0.000 
6 D   3.250 0.000 3.011 0.000 0.475 0.637 
7 D   -2.882 0.000 -2.513 0.000 -9.830 0.000 
8 D   6.234 0.000 6.313 0.000 7.732 0.000 
9 D   -5.026 0.000 -5.158 0.000 -7.665 0.000 
10 D   8.086 0.000 5.310 0.000  11.540  0.000 
eom   7.985 0.000 6.634 0.000  16.933  0.000 
bom  -2.125 0.000 -1.811 0.004 -1.417 0.486 
eoq  12.573 0.009  4.691  0.260 24.626 0.000 
boq   -1.720 0.538 -4.420 0.074 -3.692 0.635 
eoy   -33.521 0.134 -18.235 0.174 -78.397 0.000 
boy  23.244 0.071 18.035 0.020 32.439 0.045 
mom  7.316 0.000 7.010 0.000  12.455  0.000 
bh   -1.703 0.015 -2.317 0.000 -3.195 0.185 
ah  15.302 0.000 13.910 0.000 19.628 0.000 
*
t ff ∆   0.418 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.437 0.000 
*
t ff   -0.136 0.002 -0.148 0.000 -0.034 0.798 
dec   -1.132 0.010 -0.961 0.017 0.780 0.595 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t df f ∆ 0.103 0.968 4.389 0.065 2.047 0.646 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t dn ff ∆ -0.043 0.859 -0.257 0.213 -0.258 0.682 
lg
BOG miss x  
*
t df f ∆ 2.831 0.003 2.525 0.000 -0.636 0.865 
lg
BOG miss x xL2D 
*
t dn ff ∆ -2.439 0.000 -0.502 0.215 -2.714 0.040 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2D 
*
t dn ff ∆ -0.197 0.022 -0.706 0.000 -1.837 0.000 
Variance Estimates 






















0.154 0.000 0.221 0.000 
-- -- 
2
1 log t σ −   0.668 0.000 0.676 0.000  -- -- 
  3012 DD 3 ++  D 1.175 0.000 1.010 0.000  -- -- 
2 D   -0.490 0.000 -0.655 0.000  --  -- 
7 D   0.092 0.062 -0.075 0.453  -- -- 
btar   0.549 0.000 0.431 0.020  -- -- 
atar   0.793 0.000 0.601 0.001  --  -- 
bh   0.534 0.000 0.411 0.004  -- -- 
ah  1.175 0.000 1.059 0.000  -- -- 
eoq  2.516 0.000 2.179 0.000  --  -- 
dec   0.302 0.000 0.204 0.000  -- -- 
eom   0.901 0.000 1.003 0.000  --  -- 
rr ∆   0.771 0.000 0.941 0.000  --  -- 
1999 d   -0.379 0.000 -0.361 0.000  -- -- 
2001 d   -0.537 0.000 -0.561 0.000    
dof  --  -- 3.170  0.000 --  -- 
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Table 3: Thirty-Three Days When There Were Unusually Large 
Changes in the Federal Funds Rate and Large Reserve Shocks Were 
Consistent with the Liquidity Effect 
  ff ∆   miss 
9/30/1986 87  -1.453 
1/2/1987 -192  1.311 
12/16/1987* -99  1.711 
4/19/1989* 100  -1.661 
9/5/1990* 114  -2.321 
9/6/1990 -111  1.241 
10/31/1990* 168  -1.377 
12/26/1990*  241  -1.359 
12/28/1990  -111  3.685 
1/2/1991  232  -2.150 
1/22/1991**  166  -1.530 
1/23/1991*  283  -2.944 
1/24/1991  -270  1.958 
1/31/1991  122  -1.174 
2/1/1991  -188  1.266 
4/1/1991 95  -1.069 
6/28/1991 83  -1.492 
2/18/1992** 81  -1.057 
9/16/1992* 128  -3.459 
9/30/1992* 121  -3.377 
3/17/1993* 86  -1.709 
1/20/1994 -100  2.666 
7/5/1995* 152  -1.205 
12/20/1995* 111  -2.320 
1/2/1996** 133  -4.863 
7/31/1996* 142  -1.135 
9/30/1996 88  -1.628 
3/31/1997 155  -3.028 
4/1/1997 -89  1.264 
6/30/1998** 137  -1.462 
1/4/1999 97  -3.826 
1/2/2001 126  -2.036 
9/17/2001 -100  1.913 
* denotes a settlement Wednesday 
** denotes a settlement Tuesday 
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Table 4: Estimate of the Response of the Federal Funds Rate to Large and Small Reserve 
Supply Shocks: January 2, 1986 – January 30, 2004 
Variable  Normal   Student’s t  OLS—White  
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t df f ∆ 0.127 0.962 4.343 0.073 1.889 0.712 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t dn ff ∆ -0.046 0.853 -0.265 0.201 -0.343 0.632 
lg
BOG miss x  
*
t df f ∆ 3.121 0.000 2.454 0.001 -0.659 0.739 
lg
BOG miss x xL2DxO
  *
t dn ff ∆ -32.938 0.000  3.166  0.635 -15.892 0.000 
lg
BOG miss x xL2Dx  
*
t dn ff ∆ NO -1.457 0.001 -0.333 0.416 -0.157 0.820 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2DxO 
*
t dn ff ∆ -20.232 0.000 -32.998 0.000 -23.677 0.000 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2Dx  
*
t dn ff ∆ NO -0.143 0.103 -0.701 0.000 -0.754 0.015 
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Table 5: Estimate of the Response of the Federal Funds Rate to Large and Small Reserve 
Supply Shocks: January 2, 1986 – August 31, 1995 and September 1, 1995 - January 30, 
2004 
Variables  January 2, 1986 – August 31, 1995 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t df f ∆ 4.399 0.036 7.142 0.000 3.799 0.495 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t dn ff ∆ 0.039 0.910 0.034 0.934 -0.880 0.367 
lg
BOG miss x  
*
t df f ∆ 2.352 0.000 1.071 0.357 -0.739 0.851 
lg
BOG miss x xL2DxO
  *
t dn ff ∆ -0.996 0.210 -3.600 0.000 7.180 0.779 
lg
BOG miss x xL2Dx  
*
t dn ff ∆ NO 20.458 0.081  5.965  0.458 -0.048 0.973 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2DxO 
*
t dn ff ∆ -35.104 0.000 -28.756 0.000 -32.453 0.002 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2Dx  
*
t dn ff ∆ NO -0.231 0.193 -0.030 0.874 -0.346 0.491 
Variables  September 1, 1995 – January 30, 2004 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t df f ∆ -1.45 0.83 -3.88 0.70  -7.164  0.258 
BOG
sm miss x  
*
t dn ff ∆ -0.32 0.21 -0.18 0.58 0.376  0.618 
lg
BOG miss x  
*
t df f ∆ -1.98 0.56 -1.69 0.60  -3.478  0.696 
lg
BOG miss x xL2DxO
  *
t dn ff ∆ -0.32 0.39 -0.28 0.51  -21.882  0.002 
lg
BOG miss x xL2Dx  
*
t dn ff ∆ NO -20.35 0.10  -8.93  0.60 0.228 0.888 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2DxO 
*
t dn ff ∆ -40.49 0.00 -40.04 0.00  -21.093  0.021 
lg
BOG miss x xNL2Dx  
*
t dn ff ∆ NO -0.69 0.00 -0.33 0.02  -1.136  0.035 



















































































































































































  36Figure 3: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Small Shocks








































































































































































































































































  37Figure 4: EGARCH Estimates of the Effect of Small Shocks


























































































































































































































































  38Figure 5: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Large Shocks on the Federal Funds Rate on the 




























































































































































































































































  39Figure 6: EGARCH Estimates of the Effect of Large Shocks on the Federal Funds Rate 

































































































































































































































































  40Figure 7: OLS Estimates of the Effect of Large Shocks on the Federal Funds Rate 
















































































































































































































































  41Figure 8: EGARCH Estimates of the Effect of Large Shocks on the Federal Funds 
Rate on All But the Last Two Days of the Maintenance Period   
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